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A THEISTIC CONCEPTION OF PROBABILITY 
Richard Otte 
Although the doctrines of theism are rich enough to support a distinctively theistic con-
ception of probability, historically there has been little discussion of probability from a 
theistic perspective. In this article I investigate how a theist might view epistemic prob-
ability. A unique conception of probability naturally follows from ideas central to theism, 
and it is argued that this conception of probability avoids many problems associated with 
other interpretations of probability. 
Our modem probability calculus was developed in the 17th century by thinkers 
such as Pascal. But although there was one probability calculus, there were two 
dominant interpretations of what probability was. On one view probability was 
an aleatory notion. Probability was a statistical concept and was used for the 
purposes of life insurance and annuities. The other major position considered 
probability to be an epistemological concept. According to this view, probability 
was a measure of rational degree of belief, and was useful for the purposes of 
decision theory and wagering in games of chance. Both of these interpretations 
of probability shared a common probability calculus, and both of them were 
called "probability". These two basic interpretations of probability have survived 
the test of time and are still the primary ways of interpreting probability. Although 
these original interpretations of probability have evolved, and new ones have 
been developed, the distinction between aleatory and epistemological interpreta-
tions of probability is still useful. 
The first epistemological interpretation of probability was the classical interpre-
tation. According to this view, which was promoted by Laplace, epistemic 
probability is the ratio of favorable to equally possible cases. Due to difficulties 
this interpretation faced, it became less popular and was eventually replaced by 
more sophisticated epistemological interpretations. Logical theories grew out of 
the classical theory and retained a modification of the central idea of the classical 
interpretation. The logical interpretation, as developed by Harold Jeffreys, J. 
M. Keynes, and Rudolf Camap, construed epistemic probability as a logical 
relation. The amount of support a hypothesis received from some evidence was 
logically related to the hypothesis and the evidence. It was believed that the 
rational degree of belief in a hypothesis on the basis of some evidence should 
be equal to the logical probability of the hypothesis given the total available 
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evidence. One serious problem with this interpretation has been finding a logical 
relation which can plausibly be thought to be epistemic probability. Although it 
is not difficult to find a logical relation which satisfies the probability calculus, 
a logical relation that can be equated with rational degrees of belief has proven 
much more elusive. For example, upon Camap's logical theory all universal 
generalizations receive probability zero, and all existential statements receive 
probability one. But surely these logical probabilities cannot be identified with 
rational degrees of belief. As a result, many philosophers have adopted subjective 
theories of epistemic probability. 
According to the interpretation of probability developed by F. P. Ramsey and 
B. de Finetti, epistemic probability is to be explicated in terms of an individual's 
degrees of belief. A person's degrees of belief constitute that person's subjective 
probability function. However, we are interested in rational degrees of belief, 
and not all subjective probability functions are rational, because people have 
irrational systems of beliefs. A necessary condition for a person's degrees of 
belief to be rational is that they be internally consistent. Many subjectivists claim 
that internal consistency is also a sufficient condition of rationality. A set of 
degrees of belief are considered to be internally consistent if and only if they 
are coherent, which means that they satisfy the probability calculus. Thus epis-
temic probability is a measure of an individual's coherent degrees of belief. This 
interpretation of probability has been called 'personal probabi lity' by L. J. Savage, 
although many philosophers refer to it as 'Bayesianism'.1 
Bayesianism faces difficulties because it does not appear that the constraint 
of coherence which is placed upon degrees of belief is adequate to characterize 
rational degrees of belief. The requirement that rational degrees of belief satisfy 
the probability calculus is both too strong and too weak. There are rational sets 
of beliefs which do not satisfy the probability calculus as well as sets of belief 
that satisfy the probability calculus but which are irrational. For example, the 
probability calculus requires that every necessary proposition have probability 
one. This implies that all mathematical truths, which are necessary, receive 
probability one. But it is rational for a human to believe true mathematical 
propositions to a degree less than one; hence some rational degrees of belief do 
not satisfy the probability calculus. Furthermore, it would be irrational for any 
human to believe all necessarily true propositions to degree one. For example, 
Goldbach's conjecture is either necessarily true or necessarily false. If it is 
necessarily true, it would be incoherent to believe it to any degree other than 
one. And if it is necessarily false, coherence requires it be believed to degree 
zero. But we would consider it irrational for a person to believe Goldbach's 
conjecture to degree one or zero. Hence subjective probability functions which 
satisfy the probability calculus are irrational. Bayesianism is a normative interpre-
tation of epistemological probability in the sense that it attempts to characterize 
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rational degrees of belief. However, the requirement of coherence does not 
characterize rational degrees of belief. Thus we still lack anything like a deep 
understanding of epistemic probability. 
Historically there have been close connections between epistemic probability 
and theism. The first application of probability to decision theoretical contexts 
other than games of chance was Pascal's wager. Teleological arguments are 
often stated in probabilistic terms, and more recent discussions of the rationality 
of belief in God have relied on probabilistic confirmation theory. However, even 
though theists have been quick to employ the concept of probability in their 
reasoning, they have had very little to say about probability itself. Theists have 
usually adopted some currently popular interpretation of probability for use in 
their arguments. A good example of this is Thomas Reid. Reid's discussion of 
"the probability of chances" is a typical discussion in terms of the classical 
interpretation of probability. 2 This is unfortunate since the doctrines of theism 
are rich enough to support a radically different view of epistemic probability. 
In this paper I will investigate how a theist might view epistemic probability. 
I will then show that a certain conception of probability naturally follows from 
ideas central to theism, and explain how this theistic conception of epistemic 
probability is quite different from the other traditional epistemological interpre-
tations of probability. Finally, I will argue that this theistic conception of prob-
ability avoids many of the problems besetting the other interpretations of prob-
ability. 
Theistic Considerations on Rationality 
Since epistemic probability is concerned with rational degrees of belief, the 
theistic doctrines relevant to epistemic probability will be those connected with 
the formation of rational beliefs. One relevant theistic doctrine is that humans 
are created in the image of God. God is a being that has knowledge, and humans 
were created with the capacity for knowledge and the ability to know certain 
propositions. Furthermore, human beings were placed in an environment in 
which it is possible for them to have knowledge and rational beliefs. Just as the 
environment we live in was designed to be habitable by creatures with bodies 
such as ourselves, our cognitive faculties and the environment were designed in 
such a way that humans can have rational beliefs and knowledge about this 
environment. This is not a necessary situation, because it is possible that our 
cognitive faculties and the environment could have been unsuited for each other. 
Those irreconcilable differences might have prevented us from obtaining knowl-
edge about the environment. For example, there are possible environments in 
which humans would consistently produce false beliefs about the external world. 
Skeptics are fond of pointing out that these are possible environments. Or our 
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senses might consistently give rise to conflicting beliefs, and we might be quite 
confused. However, according to theism, there is a compatibility between our 
cognitive faculties and our environment. The cognitive faculties of human beings 
did not arise by chance, but were designed to function in such a way that 
knowledge would be produced. For example, our cognitive faculties may be 
designed in such a way that we form the belief that we see a tree when we are 
appeared to in a treely sort of way. In such a situation, our belief that a tree is 
present may be rational and count as knowledge, even though there is no good 
inductive or deductive argument from our experience to the existence of the tree. 
The belief is rational and counts as knowledge because our cognitive facuIties 
were designed to produce that belief in those circumstances. 
According to this theistic perspective, a person S's belief is rational if it is 
produced in S by cognitive faculties that are functioning properly.3 However, 
our minds do not always operate in the way in which they were designed to 
function; there are such things as cognitive dysfunction and mental illness. In 
the First Meditation Descartes gives examples of men who believe that their 
heads are made of clay, or that their bodies are made of glass. Our cognitive 
faculties can malfunction and fail to produce the beliefs they were designed to 
produce. In instances such as these the beliefs formed may not be rational beliefs. 
The crucial idea is that our minds and cognitive faculties have ways of functioning 
properly and ways of malfunctioning. Our beliefs are rational when our cognitive 
faculties function properly. We will say that a person with properly functioning 
cognitive faculties is a properly functioning cognizer. Two philosophers who 
have stressed this aspect of rationality are Thomas Reid and Alvin Plantinga. 
According to Reid, our minds are designed to produce certain beliefs in certain 
situations, and minds that fail to form those beliefs are defective. (p. 565) 
Plantinga goes further and claims that epistemic warrant or justification is best 
thought of as the result of a properly functioning mind.' Both Reid and Planting a 
connect rationality with a mind forming beliefs in the way it was designed to 
form beliefs. 
In considering epistemic probability we are interested in rational degrees of 
belief. According to a theistic view of rationality, our minds are designed in 
such a way that in appropriate circumstances we will believe a given proposition 
to a certain, possibly vague, degree. In other words, a person with a properly 
functioning mind will have beliefs of varying degrees. 5 These degrees of belief 
provide the basis for a theistic conception of epistemic probability. This view 
of probability was vaguely anticipated by Reid. In his discussion of probabilistic 
reasoning, he claimed that "in most cases, we measure the degrees of evidence 
by the effect they have upon a sound understanding, when comprehended clearly 
and without prejudice." (p. 691, emphasis mine) It is these ideas about rational 
belief that will be developed into a theistic interpretation of probability. 
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Probability 
The above considerations on rationality indicate that the epistemic probability 
of a proposition can be interpreted in terms of the degree to which a person with 
a properly functioning mind would believe the proposition. But, of course, the 
degree to which a person with a properly functioning mind would believe a 
proposition will be dependent upon the circumstances the person is in. For 
example, if my faculties are functioning properly and I am appeared to in a 
treely sort of way, I may believe that a tree is present. But if I am not being 
appeared to treely, I may not believe that a tree is present. One cannot legitimately 
speak of what a person with a properly functioning mind would believe without 
specifying the circumstances that the person is in. A proposition might be very 
believable relative to some circumstances, and yet without warrant relative to 
other circumstances. Rationality is relative to a mind's epistemic situation. 
Accordingly, we will relativize epistemic probability to the circumstances that 
a person can be in. The circumstances are states of affairs that can include what 
situation the epistemic agent is in, as well as what he senses, remembers, and 
believes. For example, the state of affairs that the agent is appeared to treely, 
knows that 7 + 5 = 12, and remembers having eggs for breakfast might be included 
in some sets of circumstances. We will write PcCA) for the probability of A 
relative to circumstances C. 
Although the above considerations about probability present the general picture 
of probability from a theistic perspective, much more detail is needed in order 
to have an adequate conception of probability. As a first approximation, let us 
define probability as follows: 
P cCA) = riff r is the degree to which a person with a properly functioning 
mind would believe proposition A in circumstances C. 
Although this is a useful first approximation of the analysis of probability we 
are developing, it requires modification in several directions. One immediate 
problem is that there may be no real number r such that r is the degree to which 
a person with properly functioning cognitive faculties would believe A in cir-
cumstances C. A person in circumstances C might have several different possible 
rational degrees of belief in a certain proposition. Rationality may also allow 
different properly functioning persons in the same circumstances to believe the 
same proposition to different degrees. In-this case, there would be no single real 
number which is the degree to which all properly functioning cognizers would 
believe the proposition in the circumstances, but rather there would be a range 
of several rationally permissible degrees of belief. We need to modify the above 
account of probability to allow different persons with properly functioning minds 
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in the same circumstances to believe the same proposition to different degrees, 
as well as allow a single individual several possible rational degrees of belief. 
One way to do this is to use an interval to represent rationally permissible degrees 
of belief: 
PC<A) = <x,y> iff <x,y> is the smallest interval which contains all 
of the degrees to which a person with a properly functioning mind could 
believe proposition A in circumstances c. 6 
According to this account, epistemic probability is an interval which includes 
all of the degrees to which a rational person could believe the proposition. It 
does not require that a rational person in circumstances C have only one possible 
rational degree of belief in a proposition, nor does it require that all rational 
people in the same circumstances believe the p'roposition to the same degree. 
One problem with this revised account of probability is that it requires each 
individual with a properly functioning mind to believe the proposition in question 
to some precise degree, which is represented by a real number. However, a 
properly functioning cognizer may not have precise degrees of belief in all 
propositions. Perhaps some rational degrees of belief are vague and cannot be 
represented by a single real number. For example, my degree of belief that I 
can ski down Mt. Shasta without falling is vague. There is no single real number 
which represents this probability, but rather my degree of belief in that proposition 
falls within a certain range. We can capture this idea by representing vague or 
uncertain degrees of belief by intervals instead of real numbers.7 Since different 
intervals may represent different properly functioning persons' vague degrees of 
belief, we let the probability of a proposition be the smallest interval that includes 
all of those vague degrees of belief: 
PC<A) = <x,y> iff <x,y> is the smallest interval which contains all 
of the intervals which represent the degree that a person with a properly 
functioning mind could believe proposition A in circumstances C. 
This analysis of probability allows for the possibility that properly functioning 
cognizers may have vague degrees of belief. Of course, it also allows them to 
have precise degrees of belief. A precise degree of belief in a proposition equal 
to a real number r will be represented by the interval <r ,r> . 
In addition to the notion of probability simpliciter, the idea of conditional 
probability plays an important role in probability theory. The basic idea behind 
conditional probability is that belief in certain propositions can affect the prob-
ability of other propositions. For example, the epistemic probability of a randomly 
drawn card being a diamond is affected by knowledge that it is not a club. The 
probability of a card being a diamond is not equal to the probability of a card 
being a diamond conditional on it not being a club. The intuitive idea behind 
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the epistemic conditional probability of A given B, written as Pc(A/B), is that 
of how strongly A should be believed if B were fully believed. Upon our theistic 
conception of rationality, this intuitive conception of the conditional probability 
of A given B is interpreted in terms of how strongly a person with a properly 
functioning mind would believe A if he believed B. We can make this more 
precise as follows: 
Pc(A/B)=<x,y>iff<x,y< is the smallest interval which contains all 
of the intervals which represent the degree that a properly functioning 
cognizer could believe proposition A if he fully believed proposition 
B, in circumstances C. 
According to this account, the notion of conditional probability is explicated 
subjunctively in terms of how strongly a person with a properly functioning mind 
who fully believed the information conditionalized on could believe the propo-
sition in question. If it is impossible for a person with a properly functioning 
mind to believe the proposition conditionalized on, then the conditional proba-
bility is undefined. 8 
Although the above account of conditional probability is close to our intuitive 
understanding of conditional probability, it is quite different from traditional 
analyses of conditional probability. Most theories of epistemic probability define 
conditional probability as follows: 
P(A/B)=P(A&B) -7- PCB). 
This definition of conditional probability has the advantage that conditional 
probability is defined in terms of unconditional probability without relying on 
additional counterfactual elements. But this advantage is illusory. One problem 
that immediately arises is that this definition depends upon probability being a 
real number and not an interval. Although it may be possible to modify this 
definition to account for probabilities that are intervals, it is not obvious that 
this definition or any modifications of it account for our intuitive understanding 
of conditional probability. The traditional account defines conditional probability 
in terms of the probability of a conjunction. But we are usually more certain 
about the conditional probability of one proposition on another than we are about 
the probability of the conjunction of those two propositions. I intuitively know 
what the probability of passing a test conditional on not studying is, but I am 
less certain about the probability of passing the test and not studying. Since we 
are usually clearer about conditional probability than we are about the probability 
of conjunctions, it is a mistake to analyze conditional probability in terms of the 
probability of conjunctions. Another problem is that the traditional proposal 
reduces the analysis of conditional probability to that of the probability of con-
junctions, but no independent analysis of the probability of conjunctions is given. 
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The probability of conjunctions is usually defined in terms of conditional prob-
ability. Our analysis is to be preferred because it gives an independent analysis 
of conditional probability. 9 Conditional probability and the probability of conjunc-
tions may be related in the manner described by the traditional analysis, but this 
should be used to give an analysis of the probability of conjunctions in terms of 
conditional probability instead of the other way around. However, the traditional 
analysis of conditional probability may be adequate for statistical probability, 
for which we can give an independent account of the probability of conjunctions. 
But statistical probability and epistemic probability are quite different, and we 
have good reason to think that an adequate analysis of conditional probability 
will be different for the two of them. 
I believe that the above account of epistemic probability is basically correct, 
but perhaps we can test it by considering some problems. These problems deal 
with what all persons with properly functioning minds would believe, or with 
what certain specific properly functioning cognizers would believe. Consider the 
probabilities of the following, relative to some circumstances C: 
(a) B is true but S doesn't believe it. 
(b) at least one person believes B, conditional on B is true lO 
(c) at least one mind exists 
The problem with (a) is that it does not appear possible for person S to believe 
it to a high degree. It may not be possible for person S to believe both Band 
that person S does not believe B. Therefore the lower bound of the interval for 
the probability of (a) will be very low, regardless of what proposition B is. This 
is problematic, because there do appear to be circumstances in which (a) is 
probably true and the lower bound of the interval is now low. It may be irrational 
for someone to have a low degree of belief in (a). The solution to this problem 
is to pay close attention to what the circumstances are. The circumstances C 
may include the state of affairs of being person S. If so, then the probability of 
(a) would be low, and it would be false to say that a person with a properly 
functioning mind in those circumstances could believe it strongly. It is rational 
for person S in those circumstances to have a low degree of belief in (a). Now 
suppose the circumstances C include the state of affairs of not being person S. 
In this case we have no reason to think that it will be rational to have a low 
degree of belief in (a), and the circumstances may be such that it would be 
irrational to have a low degree of belief in (a). If the circumstances are general 
enough to permit the person to either be person S or not be person S, then the 
range of rational degrees of belief in (a) may vary from very low to very high. 
But this is the correct result in this example. In those circumstances it is rational 
for person S to believe (a) to a low degree and it may be rational for some other 
person to believe (a) to a high degree. Since probability is degree of rational 
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belief, the probability of (a) must allow both person S and others to be rational. 
The only way this is possible is for the interval to be large enough to contain 
everyone's rational degrees of belief in (a). II Thus the circumstances C is very 
important to what the probability of (a) is. 
The considerations raised by (b) and (c) indicate that upon the theory of 
epistemic probability presented here some propositions are very probable, even 
though they may be neither necessary nor likely to be true in the statistical sense. 
I believe that a person with a properly functioning mind would believe that he 
or she exists, and thus the epistemic probability of (c) would be very close to 
< I ,1>. (b) is also very probable upon this theory, because any person with a 
properly functioning mind that fully believes R will also believe that at least one 
person believes R. Hence its probability will also be very high, if not < 1,1>. 
Although these results may appear strange, I do not think they are evidence 
against the theory presented here. We are dealing with rational belief, and it is 
well known that necessary truth and what can or cannot be believed do not 
coincide. For example, some philosophers have claimed that the proposition 
expressed by the sentence 'I do not exist' cannot be rationally believed, even 
though it is not necessarily false. For similar reasons, it may be that some 
propositions must be strongly believed, if believed at all, even though they may 
be very improbable in the statistical sense. Hence I do not find propositions (b) 
and (c) to be problematic for this theory. 
Comparison With Other Theories 
The theory of epistemic probability presented above is similar to other theories 
of probability in some respects, but in many ways it is quite different. One 
obvious difference is that upon this view probability is relativized to a set of 
circumstances. On this view, in contrast to Bayesianism or logical theories, 
probability is relativized to the person's epistemic situation. Both Bayesianism 
and logical theories allow for probability conditional on other propositions, but 
neither allow for probability relativized to a person's experiences and epistemic 
situation. This is significant because even if we assume that a person's epistemic 
situation can be adequately described by a proposition, it is possible that a 
proposition is highly probable given a certain set of circumstances, and yet is 
not highly probable conditional only on a proposition describing those cir-
cumstances. It may be rational to form certain beliefs in certain epistemic situ-
ations whereas believing a proposition describing that epistemic situation does 
not provide enough support for the beliefs to be rationally formed. 12 This is 
especially true given a theistic framework. Our minds may be designed to function 
in such a way that we form the belief in question when we have a certain 
experience; we may not be designed to form the belief just on the basis of 
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believing we have the experience. A proposition may receive more epistemic 
support from certain circumstances than from believing a proposition describing 
those circumstances. Thus it is necessary to relativize probability to a set of 
circumstances in order to adequately characterize rational degree of belief. 
To illustrate the problems that arise for the logical and subjective theories, 
consider a simple perceptual belief. Suppose a person is in the circumstances of 
being appeared to in a treely sort of way, and forms the belief that a tree is 
present. Neither the logical nor subjective theories of probability are relativized 
to a person's epistemic situation; therefore the rationality of believing that a tree 
is nearby is dependent upon a belief describing the person's experience of the 
tree. For this reason there are serious problems that the logical and personal 
theories face in connection with this example. According to the logical theory, 
the probability of a tree being present given a person's experience of seeing the 
tree will depend on the degree to which a proposition describing the person's 
experience partially entails that the tree exists. But there is no reason to think 
that this degree of partial entailment is high. The history of philosophy teaches 
us that we have no reason to believe that a description of my experience entails 
or partially entails that the external world exists. One might attempt to argue 
that the ratio of possible worlds in which people have tree experiences and trees 
exist to the worlds in which people have tree experiences is high. However, I 
see no reason to be optimistic about the success of such an argument. Hence, 
according to the logical theory we have no reason to believe that the person 
should have a high degree of belief that a tree exists given a description of his 
or her experiences. 
The situation is not any better for the subjective theories. According to 
Bayesianism, the probability of the tree existing given the description of the 
experience could be infinitesimally low or extremely high. Since it is a subjective 
theory, wildly different degrees of belief are tolerated as being rational. I find 
this counterintuitive. In the absence of overriding consideration it is rational for 
the person looking at the tree to believe that a tree is present, and it is irrational 
to disbelieve that the tree is present. Neither personal probability nor the logical 
theory can account for what we consider to be a rational degree of belief in this 
example, but the theory based upon proper functioning appears to give the correct 
answers. 
There are further problems that any theory which avoids relativizing probability 
to a set of circumstances by conditionalizing on a proposition describing those 
circumstances will face. Suppose our epistemic agent takes a philosophy class 
and becomes convinced that a malicious demon deceives us on our perceptual 
beliefs about trees. She also believes that this demon is so competent at deceiving 
us that we are deceived when and only when we firmly believe that we are 
appeared to in a treely sort of way. That is, the demon does not deceive us if 
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we just look at a tree and believe a tree is there; we are deceived only when we 
form the strong belief that we are appeared to treely. Hence she believes the 
following proposition: 
Q: If I firmly believe I am appeared to treely, then a tree is not present 
(I am deceived). 
Now suppose that our epistemic agent looks at a tree and is appeared to in a 
treely sort of way. We are interested in the probability of a tree being present 
in those circumstances. Since believing proposition Q is part of the epistemic 
situation, it will be included in the set of circumstances C. Assuming there are 
no other abnormal features about the epistemic situation, I propose that PcCa 
tree is present) is fairly high. Our epistemic agent naturally forms the belief that 
a tree is present without fonning any beliefs about how she is appeared to. In 
particular, she does not firmly believe that she is appeared to treely. Thus her 
belief in Q does not provide a reason to disbelieve that a tree is present. Since 
she does not firmly believe she is appeared to treely, she has no reason to think 
that the demon is deceiving her about the presence of the tree. In those cir-
cumstances it is rational to believe strongly that a tree is present, which is 
consistent with the analysis of probability based on proper functioning. 
Now suppose that we attempt to avoid relativizing probability to a set of cir-
cumstances by conditionalizing on a proposition describing those circumstances. 
According to these theories, we are interested in Pea tree is present I description of 
circumstances C). For our purposes the relevant part of the circumstances is that 
the epistemic agent is appeared to treeiy and believes Q. Hence we are interested 
in Pea tree is present / I am appeared to treely and I believe that if I firmly believe 
I am appeared to treely, then a tree is not present). I propose that this probability 
is not high. If the epistemic agent fully believes the propositions conditionalized 
on, it would seem improper for her to strongly believe that a tree is present. Since 
she fully believes she is appeared to treely, she would believe that the demon was 
deceiving her; therefore she should not strongly believe that a tree is present. But 
this seems to be the wrong result for this example. In the example given, the 
epistemic agent does not form any beliefs about how she is appeared to. Hence it 
is rational for her to believe that a tree is present. 13 
The reason this proposal gives the wrong result is that it is telling us what it 
would be rational to believe in circumstances different from the one given in the 
example. It correctly claims that it is irrational to believe the tree is present if she 
fully believes she is being appeared to treely, but it is incorrect to claim it is irrational 
to believe the tree is present if she does not form that belief about how she is 
appeared to. Conditionalizing on propositions describing the epistemic situation 
instead of relativizing probability to the epistemic situation fails because it does not 
distinguish between two different epistemic situations. The epistemic situation of 
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being appeared to treely and believing Q is very different from the epistemic situation 
of fully believing that one is being appeared to treely and believing Q. It is rational 
to believe a tree is present in the former epistemic situation, but not in the latter. 
The theory based on proper functioning is sensitive to these distinctions and gives 
the correct result because it relativizes probability to an epistemic situation. Simply 
conditionalizing on propositions describing those situations will give unintuitive 
results, because very different epistemic situations will not be distinguished. 
Theories of rational belief can usefully be divided into two types: internalist and 
externalist theories. According to internalist theories of rationality, whether or not 
a belief is rational depends only upon the individual epistemic agent and not upon 
any factors external to the agent. Two prominent versions of this are Chisholmian 
and Cartesian internalism. According to these positions, whether a belief is rational 
is within the control of the epistemic agent. If the epistemic agent is responsible 
and fulfills all his intellectual obligations, then his beliefs are rational, regardless 
of what the agent is unaware of or how the beliefs were formed. Rationality consists 
in how the epistemic data is used, and since that is within the control of the epistemic 
agent, rationality is also within the epistemic agent's control. 
In contrast to internalism, externalism holds that factors outside the agent's control 
are relevant to the rationality of a belief. The rationality of a belief does not consist 
only in whether the agent applied correct epistemic principles to the data he or she 
had, but it may also depend upon factors that the epistemic agent is unaware of. 
According to externalism, a person could diligently and responsibly fulfill all intel-
lectual obligations and still form an irrational belief, since not all the requirements 
for rationality are under our control. Clearly the theistic view of rationality based 
on proper functioning is an externalist theory. Other externalist theories base ration-
ality on causal connections between a state of affairs and a belief, or upon reliable 
belief-producing mechanisms. 
From an externalist point of view rationality is not dependent only upon what 
the epistemic agent believes, but also upon properties of the epistemic situation of 
which the agent may be unaware. Hence, even if our experiences and epistemic 
situation could be adequately described by a proposition, and even if a proposition 
received as much support from believing the proposition describing the experience 
as it does from the experience, it would still be necessary to relativize probability 
to the agent's epistemic situation. The reason for this is that some aspects of a 
person's epistemic situation cannot possibly be contained in the propositions that 
are conditionalized on. In particular, aspects of the person's epistemic situation that 
are not believed by the person cannot appropriately be included in the propositions 
conditionalized on. Epistemic conditional probability expresses rational degree of 
belief, given that the person believes the propositions conditionalized on. Because 
of the requirement that a person believe the information conditionalized on, aspects 
of the person's epistemic situation that the person does not believe to be true cannot 
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be included in the infonnation conditionalized on. In contrast to this, the relevant 
set of circumstances does not need to be known or even believed by the person. 
In the theory presented above, probability is conditional on the circumstances actually 
occurring, not upon the circumstances being known or believed to have occurred. 
Thus the set of circumstances can include aspects of the person's epistemic situation 
relevant to the proposition that are not believed by the person. For example, a 
person may be appeared to in a way that she is not conscious of; nonetheless, how 
she is appeared to may be relevant to some current belief of hers. Or she might be 
appeared to in a certain manner, but not fonn any beliefs about how she is appeared 
to. Upon theories of epistemic conditional probability, in situations such as these 
no proposition describing how she is appeared to is conditionalized on in order to 
determine rational degrees of belief. This is simply because the person does not 
believe she is appeared to in that manner. However, upon the theory of probability 
presented above, how the person is appeared to is relevant to rational belief because 
it is a relevant aspect of the person's epistemic situation. It is not required that the 
person believe that she is appeared to in that way; what matters is that how she is 
appeared to is a part of her epistemic situation. 
Consider the following example in which an epistemic agent lacks certain beliefs 
about the epistemic situation. The agent is appeared to a treely, and we are interested 
in the probability that a tree is present conditional on the agent not being appeared 
to treely: 
Pappeared to treelia tree is present I not appeared to treely). 
This probability depends upon what a person with a properly functioning mind 
would believe if he were appeared to treely, but fully believed that he was not 
appeared to treely. I believe in some situations it would be reasonable for the person 
to believe rather strongly that a tree is not present, because he fully believes that 
he is not experiencing a tree. If we do not relativize probability to the epistemic 
situation and instead conditionalize on a proposition describing the experience, we 
are interested in the following probability: 
Pea tree I is present appeared to treely and not appeared to treely). 
This is problematic. It is undefined upon both the logical and personal theories of 
probability and thus those theories cannot account for situations such as this. If we 
interpret probability as based upon a properly functioning mind but not relativized 
to the epistemic situation, this may be defined. This interpretation of conditional 
probability assumes it is possible for a person with a properly functioning mind to 
fully believe both that he is and is not appeared to treely. If this is possible, then 
it is unclear what is rational to believe in this situation. Certainly it is not clear that 
it is rational to strongly disbelieve that a tree exists; thus this result is different from 
that of the theory relativized to an epistemic situation. Attempting to capture all 
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aspects of the epistemic situation in a proposition that is conditionalized on does 
not give intuitively correct results in situations such as these. 
One might object that it is impossible for a person to both be appeared to treely 
and fully believe that he is not being appeared to treely. It might be thought that 
our beliefs about our experiences are incorrigible. More specifically, it might be 
claimed that a properly functioning cognizer's beliefs about his or her experiences 
are incorrigible. If so, the above problem would not arise for theories that do not 
relativize probability to an epistemic situation. 
The response to this objection is to deny that beliefs about one's experience are 
incorrigible, even for a person with a properly functioning mind. Consider the 
following variation of 1. L. Austin's example in which a person looks at a magenta 
colored object and yet believes it is vermilion. Perhaps the person was not paying 
attention to his visual field, but due to no defect in his mind he believes that the 
object is vermilion instead of magenta. We might wonder what the probability of 
a person making this mistake is. According to the theory based on proper functioning, 
we are interested in the following: 
P object appears magenta(object appears vermilion). 
Since a person with a properly functioning mind could be mistaken about the color 
of the object, and even about how the object appears to him, this probability could 
be greater than zero. 
Now suppose we look at this from the perspective of a traditional theory which 
does not conditionalize on the epistemic situation. According to these theories, we 
should conditionalize on a proposition describing the experience. 14 We would then 
be interested in the following probability: 
P(object appears vermilion / object appears magenta) 
This probability is equal to zero. According to the logical and subjective theories, 
the above probability is equal to: 
P(object appears vermilion & object appears magenta) 
P(object appears magenta) 
But an object cannot appear two different colors at once; thus P( object appears 
vermilion & object appears magenta) is equal to zero. From this it follows that the 
above conditional probability is equal to zero on the logical and subjective interpre-
tations. If we adopt the counterfactual definition of conditional probability presented 
above, but not relativized to an epistemic situation, then the above probability is 
still zero. If a person with a properly functioning mind fully believed the object 
appeared magenta, he would believe to degree zero that it appeared vermilion. Thus 
the above probability is zero upon any theory that attempts to avoid relativizing 
probability to an epistemic situation by conditionalizing on propositions describing 
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experience. It appears that a view of probability relativized to an epistemic situation 
deals with these situations much more satisfactorily than alternative theories do. 
Let us now consider other aspects of the conception of probability presented 
above. Like the logical theory, and unlike personal probability, the theory presented 
is an objective theory of probability. Even though probability is highly sensitive to 
what circumstances a person is in, it does not depend upon what particular person 
is in those circumstances. 15 Unlike the theory based upon proper functioning, sub-
jective theories allow for the possibility that two different rational persons could be 
in the same circumstances, have exactly the same evidence, and yet assign wildly 
different probabilities to all contingent propositions. This is a problem for subjec-
tivism because not all coherent probability assignments are rational. The rationality 
of a belief is not dependent upon the particular person holding that belief. 
One difference between the logical theory of probability and personal probability 
is that personal probability is a normative theory and the logical theory can be 
thought of as a factual theory of probability. Personal probability is a normative 
theory because it does not simply tell us what people's degrees of belief are; it tells 
us what they should be. This separates personal probability from other theories of 
subjective probability which merely report a person's actual degrees of belief. The 
logical theory views probability as a logical relation; that part of the theory makes 
no normative claims about rational degrees of belief. It is a factual theory that 
defines partial entailment in terms of a logical relation. However, the logical theory 
is usually supplemented with a normative claim that rational degrees of belief should 
be equal to logical probabilities. The theory presented in this paper is also a normative 
theory. It makes claims about what our degrees of belief should be in order to be 
rational and it excludes many degrees of belief as being irrational. It does not merely 
report what people do believe, but it defines probability in terms of what they would 
believe if their minds were functioning properly. 
Another major difference between the theory presented above and the traditional 
theories is that neither personal probability nor the logical theory makes reference 
to an agent in detemlining whether a belief or set of beliefs is rational. According 
to personal probability, beliefs are rational if they satisfy the probability calculus; 
no reference to an epistemic agent is needed. Of course the degrees of beliefs are 
beliefs of an agent, but whether they are rational or not has nothing to do with the 
agent; rationality is based upon coherence. 16 Similar considerations are true of logical 
theories. Probability on the logical theory is a logical relation and degrees of partial 
entailment are independent of any epistemic agent. Neither personal probability nor 
the logical theory requires reference to an epistemic agent in determining rational 
degrees of belief. 
In contrast to the logical and personal theories of probability, the theory presented 
here provides an intimate connection between rational degrees of belief and an 
epistemic agent. Whether or not it is rational to believe certain propositions to 
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certain degrees does not only depend upon the propositions and their relations to 
each other, but it also depends upon what a person with a properly functioning 
mind would believe. Rationality is not analyzed as being independent of an epistemic 
agent in a set of circumstances. One consequence of this is that probability is also 
relative to a certain species. From a theistic perspective it is plausible to believe 
that there are rational creatures other than humans and that their minds are designed 
to function quite differently from the way ours function. For example, it could be 
the case that all mathematical tmths are self-evident to non-defective members of 
a different species. Perhaps this is tme of angels. If this is so, the degree to which 
a properly functioning cognizer would believe mathematical propositions would 
depend upon what type of person it was. Certainly not all mathematical propositions 
are self-evident to properly functioning human cognizers, but they may be self-evi-
dent to properly functioning angels. Thus a mathematical proposition might have 
a very low probability relative to humans, but have a very high probability relative 
to some other species. It may also be the case that some conditional probabilities 
are defined for some species and undefined for other species. It may be impossible 
for humans to believe some propositions, but for angels it may be a simple matter 
to believe them. If so, certain conditional probabilities will be defined for angels 
that are undefined for humans. What it is rational for a person to believe depends 
upon the way his cognitive faculties were designed to function, and this may differ 
among species. Since probability is dependent upon what a properly functioning 
cognizer would believe, probability is species relative. 
Assessment of the Theory 
I propose that the view of probability presented above is an improvement over 
traditional interpretations of epistemic probability. A theistic view of probability 
avoids many of the problems that face subjective and logical theories; further it 
does not appear to have any significant problems specific to it. However, in judging 
the adequacy of a certain interpretation of probability, we must make use of some 
criteria by which we can determine the advantages and disadvantages of it. W. C. 
Salmon has presented three criteria which he claims must be satisfied by any 
acceptable interpretation of probability. 17 In what follows we will investigate whether 
the theory of probability presented in this article satisfies Salmon's three criteria. 
Salmon's first criterion is that of admissibility. This requires that probabilities 
satisfy the probability calculus. If an interpretation of probability does not satisfy 
the probability calculus, it is inadmissible and hence an unacceptable interpretation 
of probability. Both the personal and logical theories are admissible interpretations 
of probability because both guarantee that probabilities satisfy the probability cal-
culus. 
In contrast to the personal and logical theories, the theistic interpretation of 
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probability does not guarantee that epistemic probabilities satisfy the probability 
calculus. Just representing probabilities by intervals instead of real numbers violates 
the calculus, since the probability calculus requires that probability be a real number. 
However there are more serious ways in which this interpretation violates the 
probability calculus. The probability calculus requires that every necessary proposi-
tion receive a probability of I. Thus if the theory of probability presented here is 
to be admissible, it must require that a person with a properly functioning mind 
believe two things: 1) every necessary truth to degree I; and 2) every logical 
consequence of a proposition at least as strongly as the original proposition. Perhaps 
this is a legitimate requirement for properly functioning cognizers of some other 
species, but it seems implausible to require that a properly functioning human believe 
every necessary truth to degree I. There may be creatures who were designed to 
be logically omniscient and believe every necessary truth to degree 1, but that seems 
to be too strong a requirement for humans who are not logically omniscient. In 
defense of the criterion of admissibility many philosophers claim they are interested 
in ideal rationality. The relevance of this is not clear since this response concedes 
that humans are not logically omniscient and that it is unreasonable to require logical 
omniscience of a rational human. It is a mistake to require that human epistemic 
probabilities satisfy the probability calculus; therefore it does not count against the 
theory based upon proper functioning that it does not require rational degrees of 
belief to satisfy the calculus. The criterion of admissibility is not a legitimate criterion 
for human epistemic probability, although it may be a legitimate requirement for 
statistical probability. 
Salmon's second criterion is that of ascertainability. An interpretation of proba-
bility satisfies this criterion if it is possible to determine the probability of proposi-
tions. The intuition Salmon is expressing with this requirement is that an interpretation 
of probability is useless if we cannot ordinarily know what the probability of a 
proposition is. One might object to the theory of probability presented here by 
claiming that we cannot know when a mind is functioning properly, and hence we 
cannot have knowledge of probabilities. 
The response to this objection claims that it is possible for us to know when a 
person's mind is functioning properly. One reason we claim that people are mentally 
ill is that we believe their minds are not working properly. Thomas Reid, who 
incorporated the idea of a properly functioning mind into his epistemology, also 
thought it was possible for us to know when a mind was working properly. According 
to Reid, disagreements about first principles, which are the dictates of common 
sense, are due to defects or prejudices in our minds. (pp. 565-575). Fortunately we 
are able to recognize these defects and errors: 
Thus I have endeavoured to shew, that, although first principles are not 
capable of direct proof, yet differences, that may happen with regard to 
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them among men of candour, are not without remedy; that Nature has not 
left us destitute of means by which we may discover errors of this kind; 
and that there are ways of reasoning, with regard to first principles, by 
which those that are truly such may be distinguished from vulgar errors 
or prejudices. (p. 575) 
Of course, one can be a skeptic about probability just as one can be a skeptic about 
anything else. However here, as elsewhere, we need not refute the skeptic's argu-
ments in order to be within our rights in claiming knowledge of probabilities. 
Salmon's third criterion for judging interpretations of probability is that of applica-
bility. An interpretation of probability satisfies this criterion if it is useful in making 
rational decisions and in determining what to believe. An acceptable interpretation 
of probability should account for Bishop Butler's saying that "Probability is the 
very guide of life. "18 For example, personal probability is an unacceptable interpre-
tation of probability because its subjectivity undermines any justification for using 
probability to make rational decisions or predictions. In order for the interpretation 
of probability based upon proper functioning to be acceptable it must be a useful 
guide to gaining knowledge and making decisions. 
One might argue that we have no reason to think that a properly functioning 
mind can provide the basis for rational decisions. To illustrate, consider our goal 
to believe true propositions and not false ones. This objection questions our justifi-
cation for thinking that a person with a properly functioning mind will believe true 
propositions more often than false ones or that such a person will make rational 
decisions more often than irrational ones. Perhaps our minds have been designed 
by a malicious Cartesian demon, and hence when functioning properly we will 
generally have false beliefs. A properly functioning mind could easily be a source 
of false beliefs. 
Although this objection may be a serious problem for some theories which interpret 
probability in terms of a mind functioning properly, it clearly does not provide a 
reason for rejecting the theistic view of probability presented above. According to 
traditional theism, human cognitive faculties were designed in such a way that they 
would usually lead to true beliefs and not false ones. Reid expresses this by claiming 
that " ... the faculties which God has given us are not in their nature falla-
cious .... " (p. 565) More recently this idea has been stated by Plantinga: 
In setting out to create human beings in his image, then, God set out to 
create them in such a way that they could reflect his capacity to grasp 
concepts and hold beliefs. Furthermore, he proposed to create them in 
such a way that they can reflect his ability to hold true beliefs. He therefore 
created us with cognitive faculties designed to enable us to achieve true 
beliefs with respect to a wide variety of propositions . . . . "19 
This response to the objection claims that God wants humans to have true beliefs, 
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and that he designed and created them in such a way that they would usually achieve 
this goal. Given this theistic perspective, it is reasonable to believe that a properly 
functioning mind would be a reliable foundation for decision making. It is this 
theistic framework that excludes the possibility of our minds being designed by a 
Cartesian demon, and allows rationa: beliefs and decisions to be based upon what 
a person with a properly functioning mind would believe. Thus, this theistic view 
of probability satisfies the criterion of applicability. I believe it is the only interpre-
tation of epistemic probability which satisfies both the criterion of ascertainability 
and of applicability. 
One interesting result of the view of probability based on proper functioning is 
that it is relevant to probabilistic arguments presented for many philosophical pos-
itions. Since probability is a function of what a person with a properly functioning 
mind would believe, many claims about what a person with a properly functioning 
mind would believe can now be construed as implicit probability statements. For 
example, John Calvin thought that in the circumstances of observing the night sky, 
a properly functioning human would fonn beliefs about the magnificence of God. 
According to the theory presented above, Calvin's claim would imply that in those 
circumstances the epistemic probability of God existing is high. However, there is 
a big difference between claiming that in the circumstances of observing the night 
sky the probability of God existing is high, and claiming that the probability of 
God existing conditional on a proposition describing the night sky is high. Confusing 
these probabilities may account for the historical popularity of teleological arguments 
designed to show that the probability of God existing given our observation of order 
in the world is high. If the view of probability presented above is correct, the debate 
over the teleological argument is really a disagreement over what a properly func-
tioning mind should believe. 
In this paper we have investigated how a theist might view probability. Epis-
temological theories of probability interpret probability in tenns of rational degree 
of belief, and we have seen that some doctrines of traditional theism are relevant 
to rationality. Therefore it is entirely natural for theists to have a view of probability 
that is significantly different from that found in other theories of epistemic probability. 
I hope this paper has demonstrated some of the advantages of looking at probability 
from a theistic perspective. 20 
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446 Faith and Philosophy 
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5. It is important to be clear about two fundamentally different possible interpretations of probability 
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functioning mind can produce degrees of belief as well as complete belief. Upon an alternative theory 
degrees of belief would be a measure of the degree to which a mind is functioning properly. These 
ways of viewing degrees of belief are not the same, and are fundamentally different. Upon one view a 
mind can be functioning properly without any improper functioning and yet produce degrees of belief. 
On the other view, when a mind is functioning properly with no amount of improper functioning, only 
instances of complete belief will be produced. 
6. When I define Pc(A) in terms of what a person with a properly functioning mind could believe, I 
do not mean that P C<A) is defined in tenns of what it is logically possible for a person with a properly 
functioning mind to believe. Instead, PC<A) is defined in terms of counterfactual situations in which a 
person with a properly functioning mind is in circumstances C. If one were to adopt the possible worlds 
analysis of counterfactuals, probability would be defined in terms of the closest possible worlds in which 
fhere is a person with a properly functioning mind in circumstances C. 
7. Recently it has become popular to use sets of probability functions instead of intervals to represent 
vague degrees of belief. One disadvantage of this method is that it seems to assume that the agent has 
a probability function that is a member of the set. This seems to deny the intuition that one's degrees 
of belief may actually be vague. 
8. Upon this account some propositions are possibly true, but cannot be conditionalized on. Some 
philosophers consider this a reason to reject such theories of conditional probability. See Bas C. van 
Fraassen, "Belief and the Will", The Journal of Philosophy, volume LXXXI, number 5, May 1964, 
pp. 235-256. However, probability is relativized to a set of circumstances according to this theory, and 
hence it is possible to have probability rclativized to partial belief in such propositions. 
9. An alternative method is to follow Ramsey in defining conditional probability in ternlS of conditional 
credence, for which a Dutch book justification can be given. 
10. We are interested in Petat least one person believes BIB is true). 
11. In some situations it may be the case that for some properly functioning cognizers the rational degree 
of belief in proposition B is <x ,y >, and for another group of properly functioning cognizers the rational 
degree of belief in B will be <y+6,Z. The probability of B in those circumstances will be <x,z>, 
since that is the interval that includes the degrees of belief in B of all properly functioning cognizers. 
This does not imply that y+ .56 is a rational degree of belief for anyone. It may be that no properly 
functioning cognizer can believe B to that degree in those circumstances. Our analysis of PdB)= <x,y> 
does not claim that every real number or interval contained in <x,y> is a rational degree of belief in 
proposition B in circumstances C; it only claims that all rational degrees of belief are contained in that 
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R: All beliefs believed on the basis of a belief that I am appeared to treely are unjustified. 
14. One might object that this case can be handled hy Jeffrey's probability kinematics. But Jeffrey's 
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added. but that does not affect this basic point. 
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